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Gray (international business and economics, Rutgers U.) and Dilyard (St. Francis College) collect 30 articles from 1987-2003 on globalization and economic and financial instability. The articles deal with the problem in general terms, then developing nations, regional instability, instability in the industrialized world, and structural weaknesses in the international financial architecture. A sampling of specific topics: banking and currency, monetary reform, foreign investment and sustainable development, Brazil, East Asia, Taiwan, Malaysia, the US economy, Russia, and the Washington Consensus. Articles were drawn from books and journals and were written by internationally based scholars and researchers. The book is intended for students, researchers, and professors in economics, business, and international political economy. Annotation ©2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Gray (international business and economics, Rutgers U.) and Dilyard (St. Francis College) collect 30 articles from 1987-2003 on globalization and economic and financial instability. The articles deal with the problem in general terms, then developing nations, regional instability, instability in the industrialized world, and structural weaknesses in the international financial architecture. A sampling of specific topics: banking and currency, monetary reform, foreign investment and sustainable development, Brazil, East Asia, Taiwan, Malaysia, the US economy, Russia, and the Washington Consensus. Articles were drawn from books and journals and were written by internationally based scholars and researchers. The book is intended for students, researchers, and professors in economics, business, and international political economy. Annotation ©2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Tuckett argues that most economists' explanations of the financial crisis miss its essence; they ignore critical components of human psychology. He offers a deeper understanding of financial market behaviour and investment processes by recognizing the role played by unconscious needs and fears in all investment activity.

Tuckett argues that most economists' explanations of the financial crisis miss its essence; they ignore critical components of human psychology. He offers a deeper understanding of financial market behaviour and investment processes by recognizing the role played by unconscious needs and fears in all investment activity.

Brand New US Edition textbook. Ship from Multiple Locations, including Asia , Hong Kong ,Taiwan , US or Canada depend on stock location.

The compendium of papers in this volume focuses on aspects of economic uncertainty, financial instabilities and asset bubbles.Economic uncertainty is modeled in continuous time using the mathematical techniques of stochastic calculus. A detailed treatment of important topics is provided, including the existence and uniqueness of asymptotic economic growth, the modeling of inflation and interest rates, the decomposition of inflation and its volatility, and the extension of the quantity theory of money to allow for randomness.The reader is also introduced to the methods of chaotic dynamics, and this methodology is applied to asset pricing, the European equity markets, and the multi-fractality in foreign currency markets.Since the techniques of stochastic calculus and chaotic dynamics do not readily accommodate the presence of stochastic bubbles, several papers discuss in depth the presence of financial bubbles in asset prices, and econometric work is performed to link such bubbles to monetary policy.Finally, since bubbles often burst rather than deflate slowly, the last section of the book studies the crash of October 1987 as well as other crashes of national equity markets due to the Persian gulf crisis.

In the winter of 1933, the American financial and economic system collapsed. Since then economists, policy makers and financial analysts throughout the world have been haunted by the question of whether "It" can happen again. In 2008 "It" very nearly happened again as banks and mortgage lenders in the USA and beyond collapsed. The disaster sent economists, bankers and policy makers back to the ideas of Hyman Minsky – whose celebrated 'Financial Instability Hypothesis' is widely regarded as predicting the crash of 2008 – and led Wall Street and beyond as to dub it as the 'Minsky Moment'. In this book Minsky presents some of his most important economic theories. He defines "It", determines whether or not "It" can happen again, and attempts to understand why, at the time of writing in the early 1980s, "It" had not happened again. He deals with microeconomic theory, the evolution of monetary institutions, and Federal Reserve policy. Minsky argues that any economic theory which separates what economists call the 'real' economy from the financial system is bound to fail. Whilst the processes that cause financial instability are an inescapable part of the capitalist economy, Minsky also argues that financial instability need not lead to a great depression. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Jan Toporowski.

The compendium of papers in this volume focuses on aspects of economic uncertainty, financial instabilities and asset bubbles.Economic uncertainty is modeled in continuous time using the mathematical techniques of stochastic calculus. A detailed treatment of important topics is provided, including the existence and uniqueness of asymptotic economic growth, the modeling of inflation and interest rates, the decomposition of inflation and its volatility, and the extension of the quantity theory of money to allow for randomness.The reader is also introduced to the methods of chaotic dynamics, and this methodology is applied to asset pricing, the European equity markets, and the multi-fractality in foreign currency markets.Since the techniques of stochastic calculus and chaotic dynamics do not readily accommodate the presence of stochastic bubbles, several papers discuss in depth the presence of financial bubbles in asset prices, and econometric work is performed to link such bubbles to monetary policy.Finally, since bubbles often burst rather than deflate slowly, the last section of the book studies the crash of October 1987 as well as other crashes of national equity markets due to the Persian gulf crisis.

Since 2007, central banks of industrialized countries have counteracted financial instability, recession, and deflationary risks with unprecedented monetary policy operations. While generally regarded as successful, these measures also led to an exceptional increase in the size of central bank balance sheets. The book first introduces the subject by explaining monetary policy operations in normal times, including the key instruments (open market operations, standing facilities, reserve requirements, and the collateral framework). Second, the book reviews the basic mechanics of financial crises as they have hit economies many times. The book then explains what central banks need to do to when financial markets and banks are impaired to fulfil their monetary policy and financial stability mandates. Besides demonstrating the need for non-conventional monetary policy measures, the book also highlights their dangers, such as moral hazard and increased central bank risk taking. The book draws a number of lessons from the crisis on non-conventional monetary policy operations, assessing what measures have worked well, and how a framework should be designed in future normal times such as to contribute to make financial crises less likely. Central bank monetary policy operations have traditionally been considered as a matter of practice, while the macroeconomic modelling of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is regarded as a discipline relying on substantial theory ('monetary economics'). However, monetary policy operations can equally benefit from a theory, and from a normative framework to guide policy choices. The limited interest that monetary policy operations have found for many decades in academic economics may well have contributed to the many misunderstandings on central bank actions over recent years. This book provides a basis for a better theoretical understanding of real-world monetary policy operations.

Behind every financial crisis lurks a "political bubble"--policy biases that foster market behaviors leading to financial instability. Rather than tilting against risky behavior, political bubbles--arising from a potent combination of beliefs, institutions, and interests--aid, abet, and amplify risk. Demonstrating how political bubbles helped create the real estate-generated financial bubble and the 2008 financial crisis, this book argues that similar government oversights in the aftermath of the crisis undermined Washington's response to the "popped" financial bubble, and shows how such patterns have occurred repeatedly throughout US history. The authors show that just as financial bubbles are an unfortunate mix of mistaken beliefs, market imperfections, and greed, political bubbles are the product of rigid ideologies, unresponsive and ineffective government institutions, and special interests. Financial market innovations--including adjustable-rate mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and credit default swaps--become subject to legislated leniency and regulatory failure, increasing hazardous practices. The authors shed important light on the politics that blinds regulators to the economic weaknesses that create the conditions for economic bubbles and recommend simple, focused rules that should help avoid such crises in the future. The first full accounting of how politics produces financial ruptures, Political Bubbles offers timely lessons that all sectors would do well to heed.

During a tumultuous period when financial speculation began rapidly to outpace industrial production and consumption, Victorian financial journalists commonly explained the instability of finance by criticizing its inherent artifice―drawing persistent attention to what they called “fictitious capital.” In a shift that naturalized this artifice, this critique of fictitious capital virtually disappeared by the 1860s, replaced by notions of fickle investor psychology and mental equilibrium encapsulated in the fascinating metaphor of “psychic economy.”In close rhetorical readings of financial journalism, political economy, and the works of Dickens, Eliot, and Trollope, Kornbluh examines the psychological framing of economics, one of the nineteenth century’s most enduring legacies, reminding us that the current dominant paradigm for understanding financial crisis has a history of its own. She shows how novels illuminate this displacement and ironize ideological metaphors linking psychology and economics, thus demonstrating literature’s unique facility for evaluating ideas in process. Inheritors of this novelistic project, Marx and Freud each advance a critique of psychic economy that refuses to naturalize capitalism.

Multifractal Financial Markets 'explores appropriate models for estimating risk and profiting from market swings, allowing readers to develop enhanced portfolio management skills and strategies. Fractals in finance allow us to understand market instability and persistence. When applied to financial markets, these models produce the requisite amount of data necessary for gauging market risk in order to mitigate loss. This brief delves deep into the multifractal market approach to portfolio management through real-world examples and case studies, providing readers with the tools they need to forecast profound shifts in market activity.

In this book an eminent international banking expert grapples with issues that surround the trend toward financial globalization and its potential impact on financial fragility. Does globalization entail the risk of greater financial market instability―perhaps even genuine systemic fragility―or will it lead to a smoother working of markets? How should governments, central banks, and international institutions respond to manifestations of financial fragility?Alexandre Lamfalussy analyzes four major crisis experiences in emerging markets: Latin America in 1982–83, Mexico in 1994–95, East Asia in 1997–98, and Russia since 1998. The author finds that the build-up of short-term indebtedness and asset price bubbles were at the heart of the four crises. And in each case the exuberant behavior of lenders and investors from the developed world played a major role, while financial globalization was an aggravating factor. Lamfalussy offers a series of carefully considered policy recommendations for the future that are both pragmatic and wise.

During a tumultuous period when financial speculation began rapidly to outpace industrial production and consumption, Victorian financial journalists commonly explained the instability of finance by criticizing its inherent artifice―drawing persistent attention to what they called “fictitious capital.” In a shift that naturalized this artifice, this critique of fictitious capital virtually disappeared by the 1860s, replaced by notions of fickle investor psychology and mental equilibrium encapsulated in the fascinating metaphor of “psychic economy.”In close rhetorical readings of financial journalism, political economy, and the works of Dickens, Eliot, and Trollope, Kornbluh examines the psychological framing of economics, one of the nineteenth century’s most enduring legacies, reminding us that the current dominant paradigm for understanding financial crisis has a history of its own. She shows how novels illuminate this displacement and ironize ideological metaphors linking psychology and economics, thus demonstrating literature’s unique facility for evaluating ideas in process. Inheritors of this novelistic project, Marx and Freud each advance a critique of psychic economy that refuses to naturalize capitalism.

Since 2007, central banks of industrialized countries have counteracted financial instability, recession, and deflationary risks with unprecedented monetary policy operations. While generally regarded as successful, these measures also led to an exceptional increase in the size of central bank balance sheets. The book first introduces the subject by explaining monetary policy operations in normal times, including the key instruments (open market operations, standing facilities, reserve requirements, and the collateral framework). Second, the book reviews the basic mechanics of financial crises as they have hit economies many times. The book then explains what central banks need to do to when financial markets and banks are impaired to fulfil their monetary policy and financial stability mandates. Besides demonstrating the need for non-conventional monetary policy measures, the book also highlights their dangers, such as moral hazard and increased central bank risk taking. The book draws a number of lessons from the crisis on non-conventional monetary policy operations, assessing what measures have worked well, and how a framework should be designed in future normal times such as to contribute to make financial crises less likely. Central bank monetary policy operations have traditionally been considered as a matter of practice, while the macroeconomic modelling of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is regarded as a discipline relying on substantial theory ('monetary economics'). However, monetary policy operations can equally benefit from a theory, and from a normative framework to guide policy choices. The limited interest that monetary policy operations have found for many decades in academic economics may well have contributed to the many misunderstandings on central bank actions over recent years. This book provides a basis for a better theoretical understanding of real-world monetary policy operations.

On Her Own tells the story of Nancy Prebilich and her family as they struggle to save their 5th-generation farm during the Great Recession. When both of Nancy's parents suddenly pass away, Nancy, her sister, niece, and nephews fight to stay afloat in the face of loss and financial instability. On Her Own represents what is happening all across the U.S. as houses are foreclosed, families are forced to move for purely economic reasons, and small farms face ruthless competition from larger factory

Penny Powell reflects back to 1959, when her father's ambition and poor judgment sent the family spinning out of control toward financial ruin, mental instability, and drug addiction and when she, at age ten, became her family's emotional barometer. A first novel.

Perhaps no economist was more vindicated by the global financial crisis than Hyman P. Minsky (1919–96). Although a handful of economists raised alarms as early as 2000, Minsky's warnings began a half-century earlier, with writings that set out a compelling theory of financial instability. Yet even today he remains largely outside mainstream economics; few people have a good grasp of his writings, and fewer still understand their full importance. Why Minsky Matters makes the maverick economist’s critically valuable insights accessible to general readers for the first time. L. Randall Wray shows that by understanding Minsky we will not only see the next crisis coming but we might be able to act quickly enough to prevent it.As Wray explains, Minsky’s most important idea is that "stability is destabilizing": to the degree that the economy achieves what looks to be robust and stable growth, it is setting up the conditions in which a crash becomes ever more likely. Before the financial crisis, mainstream economists pointed to much evidence that the economy was more stable, but their predictions were completely wrong because they disregarded Minsky’s insight. Wray also introduces Minsky’s significant work on money and banking, poverty and unemployment, and the evolution of capitalism, as well as his proposals for reforming the financial system and promoting economic stability.A much-needed introduction to an economist whose ideas are more relevant than ever, Why Minsky Matters is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand why economic crises are becoming more frequent and severe―and what we can do about it.

After twenty years of armed conflict in Angola and political instability in coup-ridden Sierra Leone going back to 1991, private corporate financial interests became the catalyst that spawned the creation of possibly the most successful private military corporation to date: Executive Outcomes (EO). With its initial task of securing Angolan government control in the Soyo oil-producing region, prompted by private oil interests, EO subsequently became involved in the war against UNITA throughout the country. With little more that 100 of its own combat personnel on the ground in both the wars in Angola and Sierra Leone, the outstanding success that EO achieved was in no small part due to the force-multiplying effect and support given by its helicopter and jet pilots of the Air Wing. This is the true story of the frustrations, personal sacrifices and too often the extreme risks that the aircrews took while flying in support of the ground offensives. Most of this was achieved with outdated equipment and aircraft that were seldom airworthy. Living under harsh conditions with the ever-present threat of enemy attack, as well as great risk from their ill-disciplined allies, the contribution these aircrews made to the overall success of the war effort was extensive. Although EO costs were but a small fraction of the replacement United Nations forces, which were generally unsuccessful, international pressure to leave prematurely, led to renewed regional conflict with great loss of life. The author describes the realities of ‘postwar syndrome’, his subsequent failed business venture in Liberia and his involvement in the conflict in the Ivory Coast that brought about his arrest in South Africa for mercenary-related activities.

The world's largest financial institution reviews dozens of retirement strategies designed to help combat the recent instability in pension plans and an unpredictable Social Security system. 100,000 first printing. $100,000 ad/promo. Tour.